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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SET,-\VYN VANDERPOOL, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
B. K. HARGIS, et al., 
Dcf cndant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. 
11438 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by Respondent Vander-
vool to collect money allegedly o-wed to him by B. K. 
Hargis, et al., the appellants herein. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
On September 12, 1968, a jury trial was held, Honor-
abh· Merrill C. Fanx, judge, presiding, which resulted in 
a verdict hy the jnry, dated September 16, 1968, awarding 
plaintiff jndgment against B. K. Hargis, et al in the sum 
of $!),5()0.00 (R 87). r_rhercafter, plaintiff made a Motion 
to Compute Interest and Incorporate in Judgment (R. 
85). Plaintiff's motion was heard on November 14, 1968, 
and interl':,;t was added to the jndgment by an Order of 
thP eo11rt dated November 6, 19G8 (R. 89). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask that the verdict of the jury be re-
versed, or in the alternative, that the case be remanded 
for a new trial. Respondent submits that the jury verdict 
should be affirmed. 
STATE:MENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts omits several import-
ant details and contains statements inconsistent with the 
general rule that the Supreme Courts accepts as fact the 
evidence which snrnJorts tlw jury verdict, and Respondent 
therefore submits the follffwing statement of facts. 
Appellant Hargis operated and owned a business 
which sold chinchillas in various states. Hargis operated 
the chinchilla business in Pennsylvania and adjoining 
states under the name of The Chinchilla Guild of America, 
Eastern Division (T. 181, Exhibits 13-P, 14-P), herein-
after sometimes referred to as the "Guild," ·with Leo 
Crowder managing the operation (T. 118, 197). 
In the fall of 1965 Respondent Vanderpool began 
working for the Guild as a salesman (T. 118, 197). 
On December 24, 1965, pursuant to a request by 
Hargis (rr. 122-124, 200, 201), Vanderpool loaned the 
Guild $2,000.00 and rt>cf~fred in return a Promissory Note 
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sign('d "'l'he Chinchilla Guild of America, Eastern Divi-
sion, by Leo 1. Crffwder" ('T'. J 25, Exhibit 1-P). 
On or ahont .Jannar.\- l, 19GG, Vanderpool, Hargis 
Cnrw<lr~r and Appellant's attorney met in Las Vegas, 
J'\PYada (T. 123). Shortly thereafter, the same persons 
met in Salt Lake City, Utah. Subsequently, an instrument 
\nLS prqiared and signed ·which purported to be an agree-
ment lwtw(•pn Hargis, Vand(~rpool and Cro\vder (T. 131, 
K"hihit 10-D). 
The purported agreement (Exhibit 10-D) contained 
n lJlank in paragraph Fifth thereof and contained at the 
end th<·n•of a writtPn condition precedent to its effective-
Mss. Vanderpool, Hargis and Cro\Yder each testified 
n·p1nling the condition (T. 130, 131, 134, 163, 165, 170, 
I 0 ·) 1 °·• ')')' ') 1 ·' ')c±G nr::o 2r::1) _·,)...,., __ i10, __ t_), '-'-±-:t, .._, )' Lir) ' ;,) _ • 
\'arnleqiool and Crowder returned to Pennsylvania 
(T.1::\1). 
Punrnant to s<'nral requests by Hargis (T. 129, 132-
1 :~{,) Y PndPrpool loaned the Guild $5,000.00 (Exhibit 4-P) 
and n•c0in•d a $5,000.00 Promissory Note in return (T. 
12!)- l:~fi, 2( 1~). Thr $5,000.00 Note was a form note, was 
similnr to tl1c• $2,0lJ0.00 Note and was }Jayahle in 90 days 
(T. 1:-l/). 
On st·vc·ral occasions \Tnnderpool rt>qnested Hargis 
tn pa:: Ill<-' two nofrs and rQCf~in'cl asc;urance from Hargis 
tktt lf;1r;.;is \\ould [J<l:'-' the Notrs (T. 14G, 14G, 148-150). 
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Crowder testified that Hargis stated that he would pay 
Vanderpool the $7 ,000.00 ( T. 205). Hargis stated several 
times that he would be responsible to Vanderpool for 
payment of the notes (T. 134, 136, 146, 148). 
Hargis stipulated that during the course of Vander-
pool's employment Vanderpool earned commissions total-
ing $2,560.00 for which Vanderpool was not paid because 
of alleged offsets (Pre-trial Order R. 26-29; T. 119, 265, 
266). 
Vanderpool filed a Complaint alleging that Hargis 
owed him $2,000.00 plus interest on the one Promissory 
Note, $5,000.00 plus interest on the other Promissory Note 
and, among other things, $2,560.00 for commissions due 
and owing (R. 2, 26-29). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 
10-D ON A CONDITIONAL BASIS NOR IN HAVING PRE-
VIOUSLY REFUSED ITS ADMITTANCE. 
Exhibit 10-D purported to be an agreement entered 
into by and between Hargis, Vanderpool and Crowder. 
However, the purported agreement was subject to a con-
dition precedent which had to be perfonned before the 
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ngreonwnt lwcame effective and before the parties thereto 
lwea11w honnd thereby. The agreement, Exhibit 10-D, con-
tained a blank in Paragra1Jh Fifth, and at the end there-
of th<' following condition: 
"H is agrePd that the copy of this contract is 
not to become completely effective until the amount 
owed to Hargis is filled in. All other provisions 
appl:v." 
Regarding the rondition precedent Vanderpool testi-
fo~d that the agreement never became effective because 
the eendi ti on was never complied with (T. 131, 163-165, 
J 70, J S:3). Hargis testified as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Bishop) Mr. Hargis, was there any 
discussion as to how Mr. Vanderpool and 
Mr. Crowder were to be notified of the amount 
to bP pnt in that particular blank? 
A. Yes, we woitld notify them in writing, as soon 
as the audit was eomplefrd." (T. 244) 
On vi or din~ examination Hargis testified as follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Gottfredson) Did yon ever mail the 
letter to Mr. Vanderpool? 
A. No. 
Q. Yon ;just stated, in yonr testimony, twice pre-
viomdy, did you not, that yon were to mail 
notice to them? 
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A. This was mailed to Mr. Crowder, because o: 
the fact that he stated, in his own testimom. 
he was the office manager. · 
Q. And isn't it true you han' never mailed notice 
to Mr. Yanderpool, as-pursuant to what yoi 
said just one minute ago1 
A. No, I have never mailt>d anything to Mr. 
\Tandt>rpool, personally." (T. 246) 
The letter which Hargis stated he was to send !1 
Vanderpool and Cro-wcler to satisfiy the condition wa: 
addressed to Crowder (Bxhibit 8-D) and, although Hargi· 
testified that lw sent the letter (T. 242), Crowder dir 
not remember receiYing it (T. 217, 221, 250, 251). Even 
Appellant's attorney, who was present when the allegec 
agreement was signed, referred to the cited provision ir 
Exhibit 10-D as a "condition" (T. 244). 
The general rule regarding conditions precedent ha! 
been authoritatively stated as follows: 
"In negotiating a contract the parties may im 
pose any condition precedent, the performanc1 
of which is essential before they become bouno 
by tho agreement; in other words, there may bt 
a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 
17 Am. Jnr. 22, Contracts, Sec. 24, page 3GO. 
A condition precedent is a fact or event whiclt 
the parties intend must exist or take place befon 
there is a right to performance. If the condition 
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rn not fulfilled, the right to enforce the contract 
dci('S n()t com0 into existence." 'Vmison on Con-
tract, Third Ed., Sec. Gr;::i, Pages 126-127. 
'J1 he same general rule applie::; eyeu "When the condi-
tion \d1ich mu::;t tah place bPfore the agreement is effec-
tive lw,-; he<'n agreed u1wn orally, even though the agree-
nwnt its(•lf is in writing. See Nidtnll v. Berntson, 83 Utah 
:i;i:i, :30 P.2d 7'.:lS and cases cited therein. 
~ince th<! agreement contained a condition precedent, 
tlt0 Appellant, who was asserting the validity of the 
agTe('lllt'nt, had the burden of proving that the condition 
Jrnd been eornplied with. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 
J "JO, J>agz• 173. Ilosenulum v. Sun Life Assurance Com-
z)((n of Cannda, 65 P.2d '.:l99, 401, 51"Wyoming195. Until 
.\ppdlant sustained tbe burden of proving that the con-
dition had hc~t·n romplied with the Court properly refused 
admi ttancc of the alleged agT0ement into evidence. 
Amwllant in hi:-:; brief cites Pages 175, 218, 244, 251 
amJ 2G4 of the transcript of Proeeedings as evidence that 
tl!P Conrt errPd in ''continnall~- refusing the admission 
ol' Exliiliit 10-D and in final1~- allowing its admission on 
a eowlitin1wJ basis." (Brid for Appellant, page 4). 
"\ reading of tlw pages in the transcript of Proceed-
illg:-i ci kd by,\ ppellant, and pag('S before and after those 
cdc1l, 1\ ill conyi:1n· tlu• n•ader that Appellant on different 
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occasions prematurely offered Exhibit 10-D ''rithou1 
offering evidence that proper notice was sent to Vander 
pool (T. 244, 251). 
However, assuming, but not conceding, that the Cour: 
erred in admitting Exhibit 10-D into evidence, the error 
did not constitute reversable error. In any event, an~ 
possible error was rectified when Exhibit 10-D was ad 
mitted on a conditional basis. 
Appellant's evidence that the condition precedent wai 
complied w:th consisted of testimony that a letter ad 
dressed to Crowder (Exhibit 8-D) was mailed to Chin-
chilla Guild of America, Eastern Division (T. 260). Crow 
der did not rememlier receiving the letter (T. 217, 221. 
250, 251). At most the evidence raised a question of fact 
as to whether the condition had been complied with a: 
pertaining to Vanderpool. Also, Vanderpool testifiec 
that the instrument was signed in blank with the under· 
standing that when Hargis obtained evidence of th~ 
proper amount to fill in the blanks, Crowder and Vander 
pool would make another trip back to Salt Lake City arn! 
haye the blank filled in and completed and the agreemen: 
would be effected (Tr. 131). Clearly, Exhibit 10-D, if ad 
missible at all, was only admissible on a conditional basi> 
If the court erred it was in admitting Exhibit 10-D 
into evidence even on a conditional basis. The rule ii 
stated in 29 Am .• Tur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 198, Page 251, 
as follows: 
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"'rhe presumption that a letter properly mailed 
was received by the addressee is not conclusive, 
hilt ma:1· lw rebutted by evidence showing that the 
ldt('l' was not in fact received. Some authority 
liolds that thr: preswnption is entirely overcome by 
the uncontradictcd testimony of the addressee that 
thp, letter i,vas ne1Jer received ... " (citing Camp-
7Jell r. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, lOOP 397 and other 
case's, emphasis added.) 
Jn Cam fJl;efl 1·. Gowans, Supra at 284, the Supreme 
Cnnrt of Utah stated: 
"The mailing of a letter postpaid and properly 
addressed to a person slmwn to reside in a city or 
tffwn to \Vhich the letter was addressed creates 
no h•gal prrsumption, bnt a presumption or in-
ference of fact, that it reached its destination. 
The tE•stimony of the witness Milner is therefore 
some evidence that the letter testified to by him 
was received hy tht- Go\vanses in the due course 
of mail. The defendants, however, testified that 
no such letter as testified to by Milner was re-
ceived hy them. On such question we think the· evi-
dence prer)()nderates in favor of the defendants 
" 
Crowder h'slifird that he did not remember receiving 
tlit> l< 0 tter ('l1. 217, 221, 250, 251) and there is therefore no 
in·t•i;llmption that tlw condition was mPt and Exhibit 10-D 
1nts i11<pro1i<c•rly rPePivrd into e1·idPnce on a conditional 
liasis. 
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The Court shonld lurn' not allowP<l I~xhihit 10-D 
admitted into e\·idcnce for another r<'ason. As llargi,, 
testified, he was to s0nd noticP to hoth Crowdn· and 
Yanderpool, Lut d;J not sl·rnl nofo·p to Yandeqiool (T. 
246). rl'he ktter 1Yas 1nitten to Cro·wder only (Exhibit 
S-D). Since no not!cP 1rns S('nt to Ynnderpool (T. 2-l:GJ 
and since tho letter was writtt>n to Crowder only, for ]fr 
''Pdification" (Exhibit 8-D), the condition was not corn 
plied with as far as Y ~nderpool ·was concerned and Ex-
hibit 10-D ~;honl<l not han been admitted ev0n on n 
conditional liasis. 
POINT II 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY SHOULD BE AFFIRJ'.IED 
Appellant contrnds that the verdict of the jury is con-
trary to the evidenc<-' pre~rntl'd h.1: Plaintiff and show~ 
clearly that the jnry was v.clversely affected by the l'lTOn 
eons rulings of the Court on Plaintiff's obj('ctions and 
the attitude of the Court towards eonm;d for tlw Dl~fond 
ant. 
The principal is well Pstahlished that 1dwnPVl'r tlwrt 
is dispnte in the evidence, it is the dnty of the Suvrcrn1• 
Conrt on revie1Y to accqJt as fact that e1·idencP and tlll' 
reasonahle infercncPs to h0 drawn tlwrdrom which sn11 
ports the jury verdict. First Security Bank of Utah 1. 
E.::ra C. Lundahl, l11c., 22 Utah 2d ______ , 454 P.2J ~'.SG. See 
also Ncimaun v. Grand Ce11tral illurkct, Inc. 9 l~tah 2(1 
4G, 337 P.2d 42-1-
11 
The jury could reasonably have found from the evi-
d('r(: pn·sented to it the facts as stated in Respondent's 
~iah·m0nt of Faets from which it could have reasonably, 
validly and lawfnllv auivPd at the verdict it rendered. 
A eardnl reading of the trial transcript will show 
that tlw Court did not err in its rulings on Plaintiff's ob-
j<>ctions, that it maintainPd a proper attitude towards 
eounsel for the Defendant and that it did not otherwise 
('IT to tli(~ prejudice of DPfendant. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NUl\IBER 9. 
Dnring the trial Appellant did not object to the ad-
1•1ission of E'videnrl', nor did hP ask the Court to strike 
out evidPm·e, rPgarding the agency of Crowder to act 
for Hargis on the ground that agency was never pleaded 
Jiy Plaintiff ('r. 12:1, 1:34, 13G, 203, 223). 
ln fact, Appellant's argmnrnt at trial appeared to 
lw. that Plaintiff failed to shmv agency that would author-
i'."C' Crowder to sign tlw notes ( T. 20G). 
Plaintiff'" Ansi\·ers to Interrogatories state in detail 
tlw ag<·nc:· n·lntiom;hip between Hargis and Cro''Tder (R. 
L"i-2~i). ;\ttac11<·d to tlte Answ0rs is a eop,\· of the $2,000.00 
['rnn1\.ssnn- Note sned upon (R. 2:3). 
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The general rule reganl;ng plt>ading agency has lwer 
variously stated as follo\\·s: 
"Generall>· it is lwld, in tlw ahsenct' of cxprE»· 
statutory provision, that in aetions on contract. 
either by or against the vrincipal, there is n1 
necessity of alleging that the contract was ex1 
cnted throngh an agent; in other ·words, the con 
tract may he pleaded as if it 1vere the contrae-
of the principal, without mentioning the agency 
The theory of tl1is rnle of pleading is that the ac 
of th:• agent is the act of tlH' 11rincipal, and heme 
ma~· lie cl~ dared upon as sncl•. An additional rn 
son ~dva~ieed in sn1Jport of tLt· general rnle is tlia 
it would :<lYfJl' ~:trongly of pleading p\·idence, 01 
at least n·dm1dancy, for the pleader to state tha· 
the lrnsiness 1. mdPr consid<>ration was done l)y ai 
agent or that, having been transacted without tl11 
Defendant's sanrtion, it was afte>nrnrds ratifo1 
lJ>. him." 3 Am .. Jnl'. 2d, Agency, Sec. 343, pag· 
700. 
"It is clear that nnder the general rule npholdinr 
a pleading stating that the princip:il hirn:wlf per 
formed the act sued npon, tl1 P agent, since he is no 
even mentioned, n<•ecl not lw named or othcnri~ 
icl0ntific"d.'' 45 A.L.R. 2cl 597, RPc. 7. 
"It is a W<'ll-settlled rnlP of pleading that in ac 
tions on contracts e>ither hy or against the princi 
lial, tht~rP is no necesity of all<>ging that the co11 
tract was exceut0d throngh an agent; or in othrr 
word:>, the' contract may lw pleaded as if it weP 
the eontract of the principal, witJ1011t rnentionin~ 
the agency ... " S9 A.L.R S95. 
13 
In fact the rule is stated in 89 A.L.R. 896 that "when 
an action is brought on a contract made by an agent, it 
is both customary and proper to plead the contract as 
that of the principal; and if the execution of the contract 
is dPnied, the Plaintiff must prove both its execution 
and the authority of the person by whom it was executed." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is surimitted that the rule governing contracts is ap-
plicahlti to promissory notes. 
It is snhmitted that Respondent was not required to 
plr·ad agenc.\'· However, in any event, agency was suffi-
<'.ientl.v srwlled out in Plaintiff's Answers to Interroga-
tories and Appellant waived any defense of failure to 
plead agt~ncy ·when he failed to object to the admission 
of evidence regarding agency or when he failed to request 
that evidr'nee regarding agency be Htricken. 
Appellant failed during the trial to object to the ad-
mision of evidence, nor did he request the court to strike 
unt PvidPrwe, rt-garding ratification (T. 136, 146, 148, 205, 
227). 
In good consciencP, Appellant could not object to evi-
d(•nee n"garding ratification. Note the following dialogue 
rwtw<'<'n tlw Court and .Mr. Bisliop, Appellant's attorney, 
fonnr1 ()TI rages 20G and 207 of the transcript of Pro-
ceeding8: 
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"THI~ COURT: No, both of the witness(•s hay, 
now testified l\Jr. Hargis s::ti<l hP would take car, 
of the notPf'. 
MR. BU~IIOP: I ?rill :1raut he said tl1at. TVe 7rn1 
admitted a!! alon.IJ he irns goi11g to take care of 
by getting rnonPy from C'~·owder; 1d1en Crowdc: 
filed bankrnpct~·, not going to take on :rn~ihim 
for him. (Emphasis acld0d.) 
l\IR. ClOTTFi1EDSON: Based on that admission. 
I wo'1ld like to rnov<> for a dir('etccl verdict; tl1t'11 
is no-
MR. BI8!IC'P: I can't admit anything for lll\ 
client on tl1at hasis." 
The record is yoid of any denial by Hargis that l1 
told Yanderpool and Crowder on separate occasions tlw 
he 1rnnld pay the two not<'s. 
Appellant's citrd authority in his Point III (Bri1 
for Appe.Jlant, page 5, G) is not aJllJlicahlf• to his argnme1( 
In 45 A.L.R. 583, from whieh Ap1wlant's authorit 
was taken the qnestion discuf'sed is the snfficiency of ti: 
pleading once agl•ncy has been 1ileadc•d, F'or instance•, H 
article statE•s the geiwral rule at page 58G as follows: 
''Sinet~ it is a g-t•rn•ral rule in most ;jnris<lictio11 
that om• suing npon a contract mack for t11P OJ 
posing iiarty lw an a;<.£(•nl ner·d not orclinari1 
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ref er io the agency at all in his pleadings, but; may 
allege the legal effect of the agent's action by 
nxt'rring that the contract was made by the prin-
cipal hirnst•lf, it is not surprising that the courts 
havP permitted to a large degree of generality in 
pleadings in which th0 party attempting to enforce 
the contract against the principal attempts to af-
f i nna ti 1.1ely allrqe tllP. aqe11cy. (Emphasis added) 
Again, in the section from which Appellant took 
l1is qnote, tl1P article at Page 610 states: 
"As a general rule, an inadequacy or ambiguity in 
on (!llcgation of authori.zed agency is cured by an 
allegation in the same pleading to the effect that 
tliP part~' ratifiPd the transaction. 
In othPr words, if agency is pleaded, it is pleaded 
:-;11fficientl)· if a technical ratificaton is properly pleaded. 
1 t is submitted that the law does not require that 
ratification he pleaded. Also, enn assmning that the law 
is to th0 contrary, Appellant waived objection thereto 
'.Yh<·n Jw allmn~d ratification, when he, through his attor-
t1('Y admitt(·d rntification, and "'hen he failed to deny 
ratifiration. 
POINT IV 
IN THE ABSENSE OF A SHOWING BY APPELLANT OF 
GROSS IN.JUSTICE OR INEQUITY, HE MAY NOT ASSIGN 
A:C~ ERROR THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION 10 SINCE HE 
FAILED TO TAKE EXCEPTION THERETO. 
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Appellant failed to ohj('Ct at the trial to the giving 
of instruction 10 (T. 325-827) and may not now do so un. 
less he shows injnstice or inrqt1it~- and special circum. 
stances warranting dC'partnre from the general rule, that 
a party nnrnt stat<> distinctly the matter to ·which lie ol1-
jects and the grounds for ohjPetion or he will be pn. 
eluded from assigning tht• giving of such instruction. 
Utah Rul<'s of Ciril Proced11re, Rul<> 51, ill cCall v. Ken 
drick, 2 Utah 2d 3G4, 274 P.2d 9G2. 
It is re;.:pectfolly submitted that tlH' statement in Ajf 
pellant's br:ef ''no argmrn•nt nece~san·" does not me~1 
the requirernen t:; sta tt•d in tlw cas<' and rulP above n 
ferred to (Brief for .\p1;ellant Page 6). 
Hm\·ever, even assuming, hut not conceding, that Ar 
pellant has sho-wn or will lw ahl<" to show gross injustic1 
or inequity and special circmnstances warranting depar 
ture from the general rule, YanclP]JOol, Hargis and Crow 
der all testified that the purported agreement was subjec: 
to a condition precedent. (T. 181, 24+). The pnrporte1 
agreement contained a condition prc'crdent (Exhibit 10-D 
Note also Instruction 11 (T. GS) which phras<'S the que~, 
tion of a condition precedrnt favoralily 1o AjlJJ<•llant. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTJO) 
NUMBER 13. 
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Contrary to Appellant's contention, agency was an 
is;;nP in the case and the jury could reasonably have found 
that Crowder \ms acting within the scope of his authority 
(T. 123, 1:24, J 34, 135, 203, 233, I~xhihit 1-P). 
Contrary to Appellant's contention that the Court 
failed to in::-;trnct the jury that the burden of proving an 
agent's anthority to borrow money is on the person bor-
rowing the money, the court so instructed the jury. See In-
struction 6 (R. 6:J), Instruction 9 (R. 66), Instruction 13 
(R. 70) and Instruction 19 (R. 76). 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
~Ui\IBERED 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. 
Ap1wllant contends that the above-stated instructions 
C•1,rc~ clnplicitious, unduly repetitious and do not contain a 
ll'ull statenwnt of the law. 
\\· 
et' Rn'n assuming, but not conceding, that the above-
t 
takd instructions are duplicitous and repetitious, Appel-
"' ant rnust show both error and prejudice, that is, that his 
D ubdantial rights are affected, before he is entitled to 
L~~1reyail. Startin L Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834; 
\ee abo,Ufuh Hulrs of Civil Proccdurf., Rule 61. 
It is snhmitted that the aboYe-stated instructions were 
pt duplicitous and repetitious but that, in any event, the 
10. . . 
ibstanbal ng-hts of Appellant were not affected thereby. 
I~ 
Each of tlw instructions given by the Conrt, ·whP: 
considered in acconlance with instruction 27 (T. 82) tlia 
the instructions given by tlH· court are to be considen: 
and constnwd by tliv jury a." ont> eonnected whole, ar 
in accordane<> with w<>ll sdtl<'d la\\'. For instance, n•garr! 
mg: 
Instrnction 14 sPe 
(iralwm r. Ashley, 392 P.2d GG7, 74 Nl\I 231 
]{ en11edy v. J11st1is, 325 P.2d 716, 64 Nl\I 131 
4 9 Am .• Jnr. St. of Frauds, Section 405; 
:; Arn. Jnr. ~d, Agency, Sc'ction 70; 
t:niforrn Commercial Code 70.A-3-403; UU 
195~. 
regarding T nstruetion 15 see 
3 Arn. Jnr. 2d Agency, Sections GS-73; 
regarding Instruction 1G see 
Uniform Commercial Code 70A3-403 (1); 
regarding Instruction 20 see 
Uniform Co1mnercial Code, 70-A-3-404; 
regarding Instruction 21 see 
Moses v. McFarland, 119 Utah G02, 230 P.~· 
571; 
rPgarding Instruction 23 see 
Cram v. Bt'ippery, 155 P.2d 558, 175 or 577 
19 
Tnstnwtions J 7, 18 nd 19 are in accordance with general 
law so well settled that citations therefore are unneces-
sary. However, even assuming error, it was harmless to 
the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trjal Conrt did not err in admitting evidence 
nor in denying admittance of evidence offered. Appel-
lant has failed to show where the verdict of the jury 
was contrary to the evidence presented. Appellant has 
not shown error in the instructions and if error there be 
it was harmless in view of the instructions viewed as a 
whole. 
The verdict of the jury should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL GOTTFREDSON 
NIELSEN,CONDER, HANSEN 
&HENRIOD 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
